2021 . Private Nuisance - Essential Factual Elements
[ Name of plaintiff ] claims that [he/she/ nonbinary pr onoun ] suf fer ed harm
because [ name of defendant ] created a nuisance. T o establish this claim,
[ name of plaintiff ] must prove all of the following:
1. That [ name of plaintiff ] [owned/leased/occupied/controlled] the
2. That [ name of defendant ], by acting or failing to act, created a
condition or permitted a condition to exist that [ insert one or more
of the following: ]
[was harmful to health;] [or]
[was indecent or of fensive to the senses;] [or]
[was an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property;]
[unlawfully obstructed the free passage or use, in the
customary manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay,
stream, canal, or basin, or any public park, square, street, or
highway;] [or]
[was [a/an] [fire hazard/ specify other potentially dangerous
condition ] to [ name of plaintiff ]’s property;]
3. That [[ name of defendant ]’s conduct in acting or failing to act was
[intentional and unreasonable/unintentional, but negligent or
reckless]/[the condition that [ name of defendant ] created or
permitted to exist was the result of an abnormally dangerous
4. That this condition substantially interfered with [ name of
plaintiff ]’s use or enjoyment of [his/her/ nonbinary pronoun ] land;
5. That an ordinary person would reasonably be annoyed or
disturbed by [ name of defendant ]’s conduct;
[6. That [ name of plaintiff ] did not consent to [ name of defendant ]’s
7. That [ name of plaintiff ] was harmed;
8. That [ name of defendant ]’s conduct was a substantial factor in
causing [ name of plaintiff ]’s harm; and
9. That the seriousness of the harm outweighs the public benefit of
[ name of defendant ]’s conduct.
New September 2003; Revised February 2007, December 201 1, December 2015,
June 2016, May 2017, May 2018, May 2019
Directions for Use
Private nuisance liability depends on some sort of conduct by the defendant that
either directly and unreasonably interferes with the plaintif f’ s property or creates a
condition that does so. ( Lussier v . San Lorenzo V alley W ater Dist. (1988) 206
Cal.App.3d 92, 100 [253 Cal.Rptr . 470].) Element 2 requires that the defendant have
acted to create a condition or allowed a condition to exist by failing to act.
The act that causes the interference may be intentional and unreasonable. Or it may
be unintentional but caused by negligent or reckless conduct. Or it may result from
an abnormally dangerous activity for which there is strict liability . However , if the
act is intentional but reasonable, or if it is entirely accidental, there is generally no
liability . ( Lussier , supra , 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 100.)
The intent required is only to do the act that interferes, not an intent to cause harm.
( Lussier , supra , 206 Cal.App.3d at pp. 100, 106; see Rest.2d T orts, § 822.) For
example, it is suf ficient that one intend to chop down a tree; it is not necessary to
intend that it fall on a neighbor ’ s property .
If the condition results from an abnormally dangerous activity , it must be one for
which there is strict liability . ( Lussier , supra , 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 100; see Rest.2d
T orts, § 822).
There may be an exception to the scienter requirement of element 3 for at least
some harm caused by trees. There are cases holding that a property owner is strictly
liable for damage caused by tree branches and roots that encroach on neighboring
property . (See Lussier , supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p.106, fn. 5; see also Mattos v .
Mattos (1958) 162 Cal.App.2d 41, 43 [328 P .2d 269] [absolute liability of an owner
to remove portions of his fallen trees that extend over and upon another ’ s land]; cf.
City of Pasadena v . Superior Court (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1236 [176
Cal.Rptr .3d 422] [plaintiff must prove negligent maintenance of trees that fell onto
plaintif f’ s property in a windstorm].) Do not give element 3 if the court decides that
there is strict liability for damage caused by encroaching or falling trees.
There is some uncertainty as to whether lack of consent is an element (element 6)
or consent is a defense. Cases clearly list lack of consent with the elements. (See
Department of Fish & Game v . Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1352
[129 Cal.Rptr .3d 719]; Birke v . Oakwood W orldwide (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1540,
1548 [87 Cal.Rptr .3d 602].) However , other cases have referred to consent as a
defense, albeit in the context of a nuisance action involving parties with interests in
the same property . (See Newhall Land & Farming Co. v . Superior Court (1993) 19
Cal.App.4th 334, 341-345, 23 Cal. Rptr . 2d 377; Mangini v . Aerojet-General Corp.
(1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1 125, 1 138-1 140 [281 Cal.Rptr . 827].)
CACI No. 2021 TRESP ASS
If the claim is that the defendant failed to abate a nuisance, negligence must be
proved. ( City of Pasadena , supra , 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 1236.)
Element 9 must be supplemented with CACI No. 2022, Private
Nuisance - Balancing-T est Factors - Seriousness of Harm and Public Benefit . (See
W ilson v . Southern California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123, 160−165
[184 Cal.Rptr .3d 26].) For instruction on control of property , see CACI No. 1002,
Extent of Contr ol Over Pr emises Ar ea , in the Premises Liability series.
Sources and Authority
• “Nuisance” Defined. Civil Code section 3479.
• Acts Done Under Express Authority of Statute. Civil Code section 3482.
• “A nuisance is considered a ‘public nuisance’ when it ‘af fects at the same time
an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons,
although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may
be unequal.’ A ‘private nuisance’ is defined to include any nuisance not covered
by the definition of a public nuisance, and also includes some public nuisances.
‘In other words, it is possible for a nuisance to be public and, from the
perspective of individuals who suf fer an interference with their use and
enjoyment of land, to be private as well.’ ” ( Mendez v . Rancho V alencia Resort
Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 261-262 [207 Cal.Rptr .3d 532],
internal citations omitted.)
• “The elements of a public nuisance, under the circumstances of this case, are as
follows: (1) the 2007 poisoning obstructed the free use of property , so as to
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property; (2) the 2007
poisoning af fected a substantial number of people; (3) an ordinary person would
be unreasonably annoyed or disturbed by the 2007 poisoning; (4) the seriousness
of the harm occasioned by the 2007 poisoning outweighed its social utility; (5)
plaintif fs did not consent to the 2007 poisoning; (6) plaintif fs suf fered harm as a
result of the 2007 poisoning that was dif ferent from the type of harm suf fered by
the general public; and (7) the 2007 poisoning was a substantial factor in
causing plaintif fs’ harm.[¶] The elements of a private nuisance are the same
except there is no requirement that plaintif fs prove a substantial number of
people were harmed and plaintif fs suf fered harm that was dif ferent from that
suf fered by the general public, but there are additional elements that plaintif fs
owned, leased, occupied or controlled real property , that the 2007 poisoning
interfered with plaintif fs’ use of their property , and that plaintiffs were harmed
thereby” ( Department of Fish & Game, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 1352
[citing this instruction].)
• “In their first cause of action, plaintif fs allege the 2007 poisoning adversely
af fected tourism for a substantial period of time, caused plaintif fs to suf fer
serious losses, obstructed the free use of plaintif fs’ property , and interfered with
plaintif fs’ comfortable enjoyment of their property or their businesses. Strictly
speaking, this does not state a claim for either public or private nuisance. There
is no allegation that plaintif fs did not consent to the 2007 poisoning, that an
TRESP ASS CACI No. 2021
ordinary person would have been annoyed or disturbed by the 2007 poisoning,
or that the seriousness of the harm caused by the 2007 poisoning outweighed its
public benefit.” ( Department of Fish & Game, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p.
• “In distinction to trespass, liability for nuisance does not require proof of
damage to the plaintif f’ s property; proof of interference with the plaintiff’ s use
and enjoyment of that property is suf ficient.” ( San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v .
Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 937 [55 Cal.Rptr .2d 724, 920 P .2d 669].)
• “[T]he essence of a private nuisance is its interference with the use and
enjoyment of land. The activity in issue must ‘disturb or prevent the comfortable
enjoyment of property ,’ such as smoke from an asphalt mixing plant, noise and
odors from the operation of a refreshment stand, or the noise and vibration of
machinery .” ( Oliver v . A T&T W ir eless Services (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 521, 534
[90 Cal.Rptr .2d 491], internal citations omitted.)
• “A nuisance is an interference with the interest in the private use and enjoyment
of the land and does not require interference with the possession.” ( McBride v .
Smith (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1 160, 1 178 [227 Cal.Rptr .3d 390].)
• “[T]o proceed on a private nuisance theory the plaintif f must prove an injury
specifically referable to the use and enjoyment of his or her land. The injury ,
however , need not be dif ferent in kind from that suf fered by the general public.”
( Koll-Irvine Center Pr operty Owners Assn. v . County of Orange (1994) 24
Cal.App.4th 1036, 1041 [29 Cal.Rptr .2d 664], internal citation omitted.)
• “So long as the interference is substantial and unreasonable, and such as would
be of fensive or inconvenient to the normal person, virtually any disturbance of
the enjoyment of the property may amount to a nuisance; . . . .” ( Mendez, supra ,
3 Cal.App.5th at p. 262.)
• “The requirements of substantial damage and unr easonableness are not
inconsequential. These requirements stem from the law’ s recognition that: ‘ “Life
in organized society and especially in populous communities involves an
unavoidable clash of individual interests. Practically all human activities unless
carried on in a wilderness interfere to some extent with others or involve some
risk of interference, and these interferences range from mere trifling annoyances
to serious harms. It is an obvious truth that each individual in a community must
put up with a certain amount of annoyance, inconvenience and interference and
must take a certain amount of risk in order that all may get on together . The
very existence of organized society depends upon the principle of ‘give and take,
live and let live,’ and therefor e the law of torts does not attempt to impose
liability or shift the loss in every case in which one person’ s conduct has some
detrimental effect on another . Liability . . . is imposed in those cases in which
the harm or risk to one is greater than he ought to be required to bear under the
circumstances, at least without compensation.” ’ ” ( Mendez, supra , 3 Cal.App.5th
at p. 263, original italics.)
• “The first additional requirement for recovery of damages on a nuisance theory
CACI No. 2021 TRESP ASS
is proof that the invasion of the plaintif f’ s interest in the use and enjoyment of
the land was substantial, i.e., that it caused the plaintif f to suf fer ‘substantial
actual damage.’ The Restatement recognizes the same requirement as the need
for proof of ‘significant harm,’ which it variously defines as ‘harm of
importance’ and a ‘real and appreciable invasion of the plaintif f’ s interests’ and
an invasion that is ‘definitely of fensive, seriously annoying or intolerable.’ The
degree of harm is to be judged by an objective standard, i.e., what ef fect would
the invasion have on persons of normal health and sensibilities living in the
same community? ‘If normal persons in that locality would not be substantially
annoyed or disturbed by the situation, then the invasion is not a significant one,
even though the idiosyncrasies of the particular plaintif f may make it
unendurable to him.’ This is, of course, a question of fact that turns on the
circumstances of each case.” ( San Diego Gas & Electric Co., supra , 13 Cal.4th
at p. 938, internal citations omitted.)
• “The second additional requirement for nuisance is superficially similar but
analytically distinct: ‘The interference with the protected interest must not only
be substantial, but it must also be unreasonable’, i.e., it must be ‘of such a
nature, duration or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use
and enjoyment of the land.’ The primary test for determining whether the
invasion is unreasonable is whether the gravity of the harm outweighs the social
utility of the defendant’ s conduct, taking a number of factors into account. Again
the standard is objective: the question is not whether the particular plaintif f
found the invasion unreasonable, but ‘whether reasonable persons generally ,
looking at the whole situation impartially and objectively , would consider it
unreasonable.’ And again this is a question of fact: ‘Fundamentally , the
unreasonableness of intentional invasions is a problem of relative values to be
determined by the trier of fact in each case in the light of all the circumstances
of that case.’ ” ( San Diego Gas & Electric Co., supra , 13 Cal.4th at pp.
938-939, internal citations omitted.)
• “Appellant first argues that the judgment is erroneous because there is no
showing that any act or conduct of his caused the damage. It is true that there is
neither showing nor finding of any negligent or wrongful act or omission of
defendant proximately causing the falling of the trees. But no such showing is
required. If the trees remained upright, with some of their branches extending
over or upon plaintif f’ s land, they clearly would constitute a nuisance, which
defendant could be required to abate.” ( Mattos , supra , 162 Cal.App.2d at p. 42.)
• “Although the central idea of nuisance is the unreasonable invasion of this
interest and not the particular type of conduct subjecting the actor to liability ,
liability nevertheless depends on some sort of conduct that either directly and
unreasonably interferes with it or creates a condition that does so. ‘The invasion
may be intentional and unreasonable. It may be unintentional but caused by
negligent or reckless conduct; or it may result from an abnormally dangerous
activity for which there is strict liability . On any of these bases the defendant
may be liable. On the other hand, the invasion may be intentional but
TRESP ASS CACI No. 2021
reasonable; or it may be entirely accidental and not fall within any of the
categories mentioned above. In these cases there is no liability .’ ” ( Lussier ,
supra , 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 100, internal citations omitted.)
• “A finding of an actionable nuisance does not require a showing that the
defendant acted unreasonably . As one treatise noted, ‘[c]onfusion has resulted
from the fact that the intentional interference with the plaintif f’ s use of his
property can be unreasonable even when the defendant’ s conduct is reasonable.
This is simply because a reasonable person could conclude that the plaintif f’ s
loss resulting from the intentional interference ought to be allocated to the
defendant.’ ” ( W ilson v . Southern California Edison Co. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th
786, 804 [230 Cal.Rptr .3d 595], quoting Prosser & Keeton (5th ed. 1984) T orts
• “W e do not intend to suggest, however , that one is strictly liable for damages
that arise when a natural condition of one’ s land interferes with another ’ s free
use and enjoyment of his property . Such a rule would, quite anomalously , equate
natural conditions with dangerous animals, ultrahazardous activities, or defective
products, for which strict liability is reserved.” ( Lussier , supra , 206 Cal.App.3d
at pp. 101-102.)
• “Clearly , a claim of nuisance based on our example is easier to prove than one
based on negligent conduct, for in the former , a plaintif f need only show that the
defendant committed the acts that caused injury , whereas in the latter , a plaintif f
must establish a duty to act and prove that the defendant’ s failure to act
reasonably in the face of a known danger breached that duty and caused
damages.” ( Lussier , supra , 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 106.)
• “W e note, however , a unique line of cases, starting with Grandona v . Lovdal
(1886) 70 Cal. 161 [1 1 P . 623], which holds that to the extent that the branches
and roots of trees encroach upon another ’ s land and cause or threaten damage,
they may constitute a nuisance. Superficially , these cases appear to impose
nuisance liability in the absence of wrongful conduct.” ( Lussier , supra , 206
Cal.App.3d at p. 102, fn. 5 [but questioning validity of such a rule], internal
citations omitted.)
• “The fact that the defendants’ alleged misconduct consists of omission rather
than af firmative actions does not preclude nuisance liability .” ( Birke, supra, 169
Cal.App.4th at p. 1552, internal citations omitted.)
• “A nuisance may be either a negligent or an intentional tort.” ( Stoiber v .
Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 920 [162 Cal.Rptr . 194], internal
citation omitted.)
• “Nuisance liability is not necessarily based on negligence, thus, ‘one may be
liable for a nuisance even in the absence of negligence. [Citations.]’ However ,
‘ “ ‘where liability for the nuisance is predicated on the omission of the owner of
the premises to abate it, rather than on his having created it, then negligence is
said to be involved. . . .” [Citations.]’ ” ( City of Pasadena , supra , 228
Cal.App.4th at p. 1236, internal citations omitted.)
CACI No. 2021 TRESP ASS
• “W e acknowledge that to recover on a nuisance claim the harm the plaintiff
suf fers need not be a physical injury . Thus, the absence of evidence in this case
to establish that [plaintif f] ‘s physical injuries were caused by the stray voltage
would not preclude recovery on her nuisance claim.” ( W ilson, supra , 234
Cal.App.4th at p. 159, internal citations omitted.)
• “[M]ere apprehension of injury from a dangerous condition may constitute a
nuisance where it interferes with the comfortable enjoyment of property. . . .”
( McIvor v . Mercer -Fraser Co. (1946) 76 Cal.App.2d 247, 254 [172 P .2d 758].)
• “It is the general rule that the unreasonable, unwarrantable or unlawful use by a
person of his own property so as to interfere with the rights of others is a
nuisance [citation]. In fact, any unwarranted activity which causes substantial
injury to the property of another or obstructs its reasonable use and enjoyment is
a nuisance which may be abated. And, even a lawful use of one’ s property may
constitute a nuisance if it is part of a general scheme to annoy a neighbor and if
the main purpose of the use is to prevent the neighbor from reasonable
enjoyment of his own property [citation].” ( McBride , supra , 18 Cal.App.5th at p.
• “ ‘Occupancy goes to the holding, possessing or residing in or on something.’
‘The rights which attend occupancy may be, arguably , many .’ ‘ “Invasion of the
right of private occupancy” resembles the definition of nuisance, an
“ ‘interference with the interest in the private use and enjoyment of the land.’ ”
[Citations.] ‘The typical and familiar nuisance claim involves an activity or
condition which causes damage or other interference with the enjoyment of
adjoining or neighboring land.” ’ ” ( Albert v . T ruck Ins. Exchange (2018) 23
Cal.App.5th 367, 380 [232 Cal.Rptr .3d 774, internal citations omitted.)
• “An invasion of the right of private occupancy does not have to be a physical
invasion of the land; a nonphysical invasion of real property rights can interfere
with the use and enjoyment of real property .” ( Albert , supra , 23 Cal.App.5th at
• “A fire hazard, at least when coupled with other conditions, can be found to be a
public nuisance and abated.” ( People v . Oliver (1948) 86 Cal.App.2d 885, 889
[195 P .2d 926].)
• “[T]he exculpatory ef fect of Civil Code section 3482 has been circumscribed by
decisions of this court. . . . ‘ “A statutory sanction cannot be pleaded in
justification of acts which by the general rules of law constitute a nuisance,
unless the acts complained of are authorized by the express terms of the statute
under which the justification is made, or by the plainest and most necessary
implication from the powers expressly conferred, so that it can be fairly stated
that the Legislature contemplated the doing of the very act which occasions the
injury .’ ” ” ( V arjabedian v . City of Madera (1977) 20 Cal.3d 285, 291 [142
Cal.Rptr . 429, 572 P .2d 43], internal citation omitted.)
• “[W]here, as here, an owner of property seeks damages for creation of a
nuisance by a prior lessee, the lessee has a defense that his use of the property
TRESP ASS CACI No. 2021
was lawful and was authorized by the lease; i.e., his use of the property was
undertaken with the consent of the owner .” ( Mangini, supra , 230 Cal.App.3d at
p. 1 138, original italics.)
Secondary Sources
13 W itkin, Summary of California Law (1 1th ed. 2017) Equity , § 174
2 Levy et al., California T orts, Ch. 17, Nuisance and T r espass , §§ 17.01-17.05
(Matthew Bender)
34 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 391, Nuisance , § 391.13
(Matthew Bender)
16 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 167, Nuisance , § 167.20 (Matthew Bender)
California Civil Practice: T orts §§ 17:1, 17:2, 17:4 (Thomson Reuters)
CACI No. 2021 TRESP ASS
Page last reviewed May 2024
Kathryn Robb, National Director of the Children’s Justice Campaign at Enough Abuse, discusses Vice President Kamala Harris’s unusual mention of child sexual abuse during her Democratic National Convention speech and its broader implications for addressing this issue in America.
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